In May 1985,the Pan American Health Organization launched an initiative to interrupt indigenous transmission of the wild poliovirus from the Western Hemisphere by the year 1990. The strategy to achieve this goal was based on the maintenance of high levels of immunity in the population at risk and the establishment of a surveillance system to detect polio cases and respond promptly with control measures. On 23 August 1991, a 2-year-old boy with acute flaccid paralysis due to wild poliovirus was detected in J unin, Peru, the last isolation of such a virus in the entire Western Hemisphere. In 1990,an International Commission for the Certification of Eradication of Poliomyelitis Eradication (ICCPE) was established by the Pan American Health Organization to eventually determine if transmission was interrupted. After 3 years of follow-up and review of surveillance data, the ICCPE declared that wild poliovirus transmission had been interrupted in the Americas.
In May 1985, Carlyle Guerra de Macedo, then the Director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), proposed that poliomyelitis be eradicated from the Western Hemisphere by the year 1990 [1] . This proposal was accepted by all PAHO member countries, and a major initiative was launched in September of that same year. Poliomyelitis eradication, as defined by the PAHO Directing Council, is the complete interruption of indigenous transmission of wild poliovirus. Several agencies and organizations, including UNICEF, the United States Agency for International Development, Rotary International, the International Development Bank, and the Canadian Public Health Association, joined PAHO in support of the national efforts to achieve this goal.
The strategy to interrupt transmission of the wild poliovirus in the Region of the Americas relied primarily on the implementation of national vaccination days held twice a year, in which every child <5 years of age received one dose of trivalent oral poliomyelitis vaccine (OPY), regardless of previous vaccination status, and surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) [2, 3] . All cases and their contacts were investigated clinically and virologically to rule in or rule out wild poliovirus infection. By December 1990, very few cases were detected in the region, and it was believed that transmission was on the verge of being interrupted.
To evaluate the impact of the program and eventually certify that interruption of transmission was accomplished, the Director of PAHO appointed an independent International Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication (ICCPE) in the Region of the Americas. This Commission was chaired by Frederick C. Robbins and was composed of internationally recognized experts in several disciplines, some of whom had had experience with the certification of smallpox eradication. Members of the Commission were Waldyr Arcoverde (Brazil), subsequently replaced by Fernando Olinto (Brazil), Isao Arita (Japan), Rodrigo Guerrero (Colombia), Dorothy Horstmann (United States), Jan Kostrzewski (Poland), Maureen Law (Canada), Elsa Moreno (Argentina), Y. Ramalingaswami (India), Olikoye Ransome-Kuti (Nigeria), Guillermo Soberon (Mexico), and Kenneth Standard (Jamaica).
The ICCPE held three plenary meetings. The first was held in Washington, DC, on 6 July 1990. Subsequently, the meetings were held in Rio de Janeiro in March 1992 and in Washington, DC, in August 1994, when it was concluded that transmission of wild poliovirus has been interrupted in the Western Hemisphere.
During the 4 years in which the Commission followed the program, its chairman and some of its members also attended meetings of the Technical Advisory Group that advised PAHO on the implementation ofthe program. The Technical Advisory Group was chaired by Donald A. Henderson.
Methods
As happened during the certification of smallpox eradication, a coordinatedgovernmental commitmenttoward active participation in certification activities was essential to generate the quality of data required. In the interest of maintaining objectivity, PAHO encouraged the formation of National Certification Commissions to oversee all the certificationprocedures and prepare and present a national report with recommendations to the ICCPE. These National Certification Commissions for polio eradication were organized in each country and included public health experts that did not have a direct interest in the polio eradication program.
The modus operandi for the certificationprocess was established as follows:
One or two ICCPE commissioners had responsibility for overseeing certification procedures in the different geographic areas of the Americas. These areas included: the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), Brazil, Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela), Central America, Caribbean countries, Mexico, and Canada and the United States.
Areas were considered for certification only if all of their member countries had been free of poliomyelitis for a period of at least 3 years.
Between January and August 1994, National Certification Commissions were organized in each country and reviewed and oversaw the precertification activities of intensified AFP surveillance, active case searches in areas of poor surveillance, surveillance of wild poliovirus, and immunization campaigns in areas of risk, such as areas where confirmed and "compatible" cases had occurred in the past.
Each National Certification Commission prepared a country report to be reviewed by the responsible ICCPE commissioner that would serve to document the interruption of transmission of wild poliovirus within each area.
At their August 1994 meeting, the ICCPE reviewed the country reports presented by the president of each National Certification Commission. Ultimately, it was the responsibility of the ICCPE to reach one of two conclusions: either that it was satisfied that transmission has been interrupted or that it would be satisfied only if certain specific additional measures were undertaken.
Information presented by the National Certification Commissions included trends in vaccination coverage, data obtained from an extensive regionwide surveillance system, which includes > 20,000 health units that report weekly on the presence or absence of cases of AFP (suspected poliomyelitis cases), and laboratory results from the testing of stool specimens obtained from suspected poliomyelitis cases and their contacts for the presence of wild poliovirus. Specimens were tested in a highly developed and proficient network of laboratories throughout the hemisphere. Certification of eradication would be possible only for the hemisphere as a whole and could occur only when the ICCPE had agreed that transmission has been interrupted in all countries. Because polio eradication is such a tremendous achievement for the countries of the Americas, the process of certification received high priority so that all countries could be appropriately recognized for their historic achievements.
Criteria and Strategies
At its first meeting, ICCPE put forth preliminary criteria for certifying countries in the Americas as free of poliomyelitis [4] . It recognized the extraordinary difficulties in demonstrating with certainty that no wild polioviruses were in circulation in any given country, let alone in the region as a whole, because of the large proportion of asymptomatic nonparalytic infections compared with the number of clinical cases. Paralytic cases (1/ 100 to 1/1000 infections) serve as a vital indicator of continuing poliovirus spread and, because of this, are very important to detect. For the certification of smallpox eradication, it was stipulated that at least 2 years of freedom from infection was required. Experience eventually showed that, with good surveillance, no more than 1 year was required to confirm that eradication had been achieved [5, 6] . In practice, however, a 2-year interval was observed. Polio presents a more difficult problem; therefore, it was decided that freedom from paralytic poliomyelitis due to wild poliovirus infection should exist for at least 3 years before it could be said with reasonable certainty that eradication had been achieved.
The eventual interruption of wild virus transmission is possible because there is no natural animal reservoir for wild poliovirus, infected persons do not excrete the virus for more than a few weeks, and wild poliovirus does not survive in the environment for prolonged periods of time. The large number of poliovirus infections that are inapparent presents a special problem requiring efforts to isolate virus from the environment [7] [8] [9] .
Also, since the vaccine virus can occasionally cause paralysis and is likely to be isolated from the environment, it was essential that viruses be differentiated as wild or vaccine-like.
The basic criteria underlying certification were the failure to detect wild poliovirus over an extended period of time in the context of a surveillance system adequate to detect cases and the virus ifpresent; a thorough country-by-country documentation of program activities and findings; and, ultimately, determination by the independent international commission that sufficient evidence was available to support the belief that poliovirus circulation has ceased. However, even after certification, surveillance will need to continue until it has been determined that polio has been eradicated from the rest of the world. So long as other parts of the world remain infected, the risk of importations will continue.
In summary, the general criteria included the following [10] : Absence of virologically confirmed indigenous poliomyelitis cases in the Americas for a period of at least 3 years under circumstances of adequate surveillance.
Absence of detectable wild polioviruses from communities as determined by testing stools from normal children and, where appropriate, testing wastewater from high-risk populations.
On-site evaluation by national certification commissions appointed jointly by PAHO and respective member countries, composed of knowledgeable local persons and outside experts. And, after the national commission considered that the criteria had been met, the information was to be submitted to the ICCPE for final certification, establishment of appropriate measures to deal with importations.
The first two recommendations comprised the foundation for the certification effort. Areas with cases of AFP that could be neither confirmed nor discarded because they did not have 2 adequate stool specimens but that resulted in residual paralysis or death or because they had no follow-up were classified as compatible poliomyelitis cases, thus indicating a failure in surveillance. This triggered in the area special efforts for wild poliovirus detection and house-to-house "mop-up" immunization campaigns. Mop-up campaigns were conducted when a case of wild poliovirus infection or a compatible case was identified. All children in the immediate neighborhood were immunized by vaccinators going from house to house. The third recommendation required on-site evaluation of surveillance criteria and local conditions by members of the ICCPE. The fourth recommendation established the need for countries to continue effective surveillance until global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission had been achieved. However, it did not imply that certification should wait until global eradication had been achieved. As with smallpox, the concept of eradication can apply to continents, such as the Americas, but to be certified, countries should have a surveillance system capable of recognizing and containing importations of wild poliovirus when they occur.
Four strategies were essential for generating country reports that would justify certification by the ICCPE: surveillance of AFP, surveillance of wild poliovirus, active AFP case searches in areas of poor surveillance, such as areas where confirmed or compatible cases occurred in the past or where reports were not received, and documentation of mass immunization campaigns in areas of risk, such as where confirmed or compatible polio cases had occurred.
Surveillance for polio cases encompasses surveillance for all conditions causing AFP in persons < 15 years of age as well as suspected polio cases among older persons. For certification purposes, it represents the most important component of all activities. It must be demonstrated that cases of AFP, when they occur, would be identified, reported, and investigated in a timely manner to insure that if wild poliovirus were present it would be detected [11] . Generally, the effectiveness of the reporting system for AFP determined how prepared a country was to deal with importations of wild poliovirus. Surveillance of AFP is the most important component of the overall eradication strategy, because it measures the ultimate goal of the program-zero cases of polio. Moreover, it is an invaluable tool with which to monitor the impact ofthe program and permit the allocation ofresources to the most needed areas.
Before 1990, cases of AFP were confirmed as poliomyelitis if there was laboratory confirmation (wild type poliovirus isolated from stools), epidemiologic linkage to another case of AFP or to a confirmed case of poliomyelitis, residual paralysis 60 days after onset of symptoms, death, or lack of follow-up ofa case. Cases ofAFP were discarded as not being poliomyelitis if they did not meet these criteria. To increase the specificity of the case definition, beginning in 1990, a case of AFP was confirmed as poliomyelitis only if it was associated with wild type poliovirus isolation. Specimens were tested in at least two different laboratories from the network that operates under a strict program of quality control.
For surveillance of wild poliovirus, the ICCPE recommended that three methodologies be used: collection and processing of 2 adequate stools from AFP cases, stool surveys of healthy children (contact investigations), and sampling and testing of sewage [12] [13] [14] . Special importance was given to collecting 2 specimens within 2 weeks after onset of paralysis, because the likelihood of wild type poliovirus isolation diminishes significantlywhen stool specimens are collected after 2 weeks of paralysis [15] .
The United States and Canada presented problems. The United States did not have an active surveillance program for AFP; however, its passive program for identification of polio cases had been sensitive enough to identify the rare case of paralysis due to the vaccine virus. Also, the few imported cases in 1989 were identified and no other suspect cases of wild virus infection had been recognized for more than a decade, nor has wild virus been isolated. A similar situation exists in Canada. Thus, while not living up to the "letter of the law," both countries presented highly convincing evidence of eradication. Now that eradication has been achieved, surveillance in the United States is being maintained in the same manner, with the only test of sensitivity being the continued identification of vaccine-associated cases at a constant rate.
Of the other methodologies available, lameness surveys [16, 17J or attempts to isolate wild poliovirus from flies were impractical for most countries because of the large numbers required for an adequate sample and the difficulties in making an accurate diagnosis long after onset of illness, since flies harbor virus only up to 3 weeks after the last case of the outbreak [18] [19] [20] [21] . Finally, serosurveys for poliovirus-neutralizing antibodies are of little value because ofthe impossibility of discriminating antibodies formed in response to vaccine type poliovirus and those formed in response to wild type polioviruses [22] .
Surveillance of wastewater for the presence of wild poliovirus was considered as a strategy but has inherent difficulties. High ambient temperatures and high bacterial content of wastewater in tropical areas promote rapid inactivation of polioviruses. Because the predicted survival times of polioviruses under such conditions are short (the half-life for infectivity is <2 days) [23] , it is likely that most of the virus detected in wastewater represents what has been excreted from children only a few days before sampling.
Thus, instead of testing sewage, the ICCPE recommended that in addition to specimens from the cases, stool specimens for virus isolation should be obtained from at least 5 child contacts of at least 80% of all AFP cases. With surveillance of AFP in place, the occurrence ofAFP cases would serve as proxy sentinel sites for collection of stools from normal children. The program requirement to collect stools from 5 children who live in the same neighborhood of the index AFP case was already in place. This ensured ""-' 10,000 additional stools being processed each year. With index cases of AFP not caused by wild poliovirus occurring more or less at random, the accumulation of these additional data over 3-4 years (30,000-40,000 specimens) was important additional information for the ICCPE to use to decide about the absence of poliovirus transmission.
Indicators
The ICCPE recommended that for every country, surveillance of AFP and wild poliovirus should meet five key surveil-lance indicators: at least 80% of all health units included in the reporting network should be reporting regularly each week; the annual rate of AFP cases should be~1.0 case reported! 100,000 population < 15 years of age; at least 80% of all AFP cases reported should be investigated within 48 h of reporting; at least 80% of all AFP cases reported should have 2 stool specimens taken for viral culture within 2 weeks of onset of paralysis; and at least 80% of all AFP cases reported should have investigations of stools of at least 5 contacts.
The ICCPE recognized two important concerns regarding certification of countries. Some countries as a whole could meet all five of the AFP surveillance indicators described above, but within the country, smaller areas, such as states, provinces, or districts, may not and therefore remain areas of concern. A second concern was the compatible cases that had occurred since the last confirmed case. Therefore, special mop-up campaigns in these areas, where they occurred, were of utmost importance. An account of active case searches in selected areas, using standardized methodologies, particularly the identification of risk areas, the questionnaire, and the analysis of the data collected, should be included. These searches should take place in areas of poor surveillance, particularly in areas where compatible polio cases occurred previously.
Other strategies for certification important for the final report of each country included the establishment of a rumor register, publicity campaigns, and a system of rewards. The reward system established by PAHO in 1988 offered US$lOO to anyone who reported a case of AFP determined to be due to infection with wild poliovirus. In some countries, Rotary International offered a reward of US$1000 for such reported cases.
At the time the ICCPE met in Washington, DC, in August 1994, it had been 3 years since the last confirmed case of paralytic poliomyelitis due to wild poliovirus was reported in the Americas. This was a 2-year-old boy residing in Junin, Peru.
Several factors made it possible for the Region of the Americas to progress toward the goal of poliomyelitis eradication. These included the very high level of political commitment of the member governments, the high degree of community participation, the strong collaboration of various agencies and organizations through interagency coordinating committees, and the availability of well-managed resources under a strong PAHO leadership.
Conclusions and Recommendations of the ICCPE [24]
"During the past 6 years most countries of the region have achieved and maintained OPV3 vaccination coverage levels of over 80%. Since the last confirmed case was reported from Peru in August 1991, over 6000 acute flaccid paralysis cases have been thoroughly investigated and none has been confirmed as paralytic poliomyelitis due to wild poliovirus. Furthermore, over 25,000 stool specimens obtained from these cases and their contacts were negative for wild poliovirus. Finally, there has been constant monitoring of key surveillance indicators, which were, with few exceptions, at acceptable levels in all countries over the last 3 years.
After carefully reviewing these data, all National Certification Commissions of the region have recommended that their countries be certified as being polio-free.
The ICCPE has carefully reviewed data that was presented by the presidents of the National Certification Commissions. The ICCPE recognizes and applauds the extraordinary accomplishments which have been achieved by the countries of the region. Overall, the quality of the National Certification Commission reports has been excellent; they have taken their responsibilities seriously and responded in exemplary fashion.
Based on the impressive evidence presented, the ICCPE concludes that wild poliovirus transmission has been interrupted in the Americas.
While the ICCPE is quite convinced that poliovirus transmission has been interrupted in the Americas, there remain several areas of concern. Although all National Certification Commissions have concluded that poliovirus transmission has ceased and evidence has been presented to support their conclusion, clear deficiencies exist in a few programs which should be corrected promptly. In particular, vaccination coverage needs to be increased and surveillance systems need to be strengthened in these countries. These deficiencies, if not corrected, will increase the risk for the re-establishment of wild poliovirus transmission in these countries, as well as in other countries of the region, should the virus be introduced.
Since wild poliovirus transmission still occurs in other parts of the world, the ICCPE recognizes that the Americas will remain at risk for the importation ofwild poliovirus.If importations occur, the potential exists for polio outbreaks, especially in areas with low vaccine coverage and poor sanitation. Poliovirus has displayed great ingenuity in locating pockets of susceptible persons, even in countries with high levels of vaccination coverage, such as the Netherlands, Canada, and Taiwan.
The Region of the Americas will need to maintain high levels of vaccination coverage until the world is certified as being polio-free. Indeed, it may be easier to eliminate poliovirus from the Americas than to maintain a polio-free status. Being the first region of the world to interrupt wild poliovirus transmission means that these efforts will need to be conducted for as long as wild poliovirus is circulating elsewhere.
Ongoing targeted surveillance for cases of acute flaccid paralysis and for the presence ofwild poliovirus will be absolutely necessary to assure that the Region of the America remains polio-free. It would be tragic, if after the extraordinary efforts that have been made to free the Americas from polio, we were to let down our guard and allow the poliovirus to become established once again.
International communication and collaboration are necessary to assure the rapid detection and timely implementation of control efforts for importations of wild poliovirus.
The ICCPE strongly encourages other regions of the world to accelerate their poliomyelitis eradication activities, since only the global eradication of poliomyelitis will assure that poliovirus infection will not cause paralytic disease in the Americas or the rest of the world. The polio-free countries of the world should realize that it is very much to their benefit to do what they can to facilitate the eradication of poliovirus from polio-endemic countries."
